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On December 16, the European Union legislature finally adopted Regulation
2020/2092 on the rule of law conditionality of EU funds. Although the Regulation
is supposed to apply from 1 January 2021, its practical operation will have to wait.
Hungary and Poland have reportedly announced they will seek its annulment before
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Moreover, the European Council
declared in its December 2020 conclusions that the Commission will refrain from
putting the Regulation to use or even publishing implementation guidelines before
the court proceedings are finished. Is the newly minted Regulation doomed by
prolonged litigation? Now that the legislative process is over, the eyes are turned to
the CJEU.
Although the year 2021 has barely begun, one may venture a prognosis as to how
the CJEU process is likely to unfold. Clearly, the Regulation is next headed for court.
Any guesses about the procedural treatment of the case, as well as the arguments
in support of annulment and the outcomes of the litigation are mere conjecture
at this stage. However, with this caveat, here are three New Year’s predictions:
1) the annulment action introduced by Hungary and/or Poland is expedited and
decided by the end of 2021; 2) the outcome of the litigation is that the Regulation
survives judicial review, and, 3) when the Regulation is eventually used in the future
to address the EU’s rule of law concerns, the CJEU is likely to again take on a key
role.
Timeline
Recent news reports have estimated that the introduction of an annulment action
by Hungary and Poland before the CJEU will delay the operation of the Regulation
considerably, even by ‘years’ (see EU Observer article here). Such delay would
make the EU toothless to police the rule of law before the Hungarian elections
scheduled for 2022 (see Politico article here). These reports are overly pessimistic.
While it is true that all Member States can challenge in court EU legislation they
consider unlawful (see, for example, a joint challenge by Spain and Finland here),
the reporting overlooks that the CJEU can, if required, adopt procedural measures to
speed up the process.
How long will it take, then, to conclude the judicial procedure? An action for
annulment must be introduced within two months’ time from the publication of the
contested act. In this case, the Regulation’s annulment is sought, under Article 51 of
the Statute, directly from the Court of Justice (and not from the EU’s General Court).
The case is therefore heard only once, with no possibility to appeal. For this reason
alone, it is unlikely that a challenge to the Regulation could take years. Even so, it
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remains true that the average duration for annulment proceedings at the Court of
Justice in 2019 was around 19 months.
However, due to the Regulation’s exceptional importance for the rule of law situation
in the EU, the case may be submitted to an expedited procedure. Indeed, under
Article 133 of the Court of Justice’s rules of procedure, this procedure may be
deployed at the request of the parties or on the initiative of the President of the
CJEU, who has considerable discretion in the matter. In 2019, the average duration
for expedited proceedings was 10 months. But the average figure does not tell the
whole truth, because of the relatively low number of such cases.
For example, in Commission v Council (German and French budget deficits), the
judgment was out in less than eight months. Preliminary rulings have been delivered
even faster; the judgment in Pringle (legality of European stability mechanism)
was rendered in less than four months and that in Wightman (revocation of Brexit
notification) in just over two months. Nonetheless, it is extremely unlikely that the
proceedings will be over in a couple of months. But considering the issues at stake,
it is a fair prediction that a final judgment could be delivered still before Christmas
2021 (see here for Closa’s similar estimate on this blog).
On what grounds will the Regulation be challenged?
To impugn the validity of the Regulation, Hungary and Poland will likely argue
that the EU has used an improper legal basis; namely one which does not permit
enacting far-reaching rules to combat rule of law breaches in Member States. The
chosen legal basis, Article 322(1) TFEU, belongs to the financial provisions of the
EU Treaties. Broadly speaking, it enables the adoption of legislation on budget
procedures and safeguards on the responsibility of financial actors. Certainly, it
is possible to make a colourable argument that the legal basis is, in light of the
provision’s wording, too narrow. However, viewed in its larger context, Article 322(1)
TFEU will probably be interpreted as providing a good enough legal basis for the
Regulation which, essentially, purports to protect the EU budget.
A broader attack on the Regulation’s validity could imply that it only pretends to
protect the EU budget but, in fact, indirectly coerces a Member State to amend its
legislation on matters within national powers. Inspiration could be sought in the
case law of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding conditional spending
and financial coercion under the US Constitution [see, for example, South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding Congress could condition receipt of federal
highway funds on state legislation requiring age of 21 years for buying alcohol)].
However, it is not difficult to conceive that the Court of Justice could find that the EU
has legislative powers to (incidentally) safeguard the rule of law while protecting its
budget.
Additional arguments can surely be crafted. Good candidates to make it to the legal
briefs of Hungary and Poland are claims based on the exclusive nature of Article 7
TEU or the violation of respect for national identity required in Article 4(2) TEU. The
eventual role of the CJEU in the framework of the Regulation might also be raised.
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Nonetheless, while the upcoming litigation is likely to demand careful reflection
and judicial agility from the Court of Justice, the Regulation – especially in its final
form – does not on its face appear to be clearly incompatible with the chosen legal
basis or offend the division of powers between the EU and the Member States more
generally. Therefore, it is likely to withstand the judicial challenge.
The Future of the Regulation and the CJEU
As for the broader role of the CJEU, the final prediction looks beyond 2021. The
original impetus for the Conditionality Regulation derives from the failure of the EU
to effectively police the rule of law under Article 7 TEU. As such, the Regulation is
often analysed with regard to the procedures for implementing Article 7 TEU (see, for
example, von Bogdandy and #acny who correctly note here the possible parallelism
of the instruments). Without entering into the many differences between these two
legal instruments, one difference merits highlighting: the role of the CJEU under
Article 7 TEU, on the one hand, and in the context of the Regulation, on the other.
The eminently political Article 7 TEU procedure excludes the CJEU from the
substantive assessment of breaches concerning the EU’s values, including the
rule of law. The treaty framers’ intention appears to have been that, under Article
7 TEU, determining that a Member State has breached the rule of law falls within
‘high politics’ and is, therefore, a non-justiciable issue. This explains why Article 269
TFEU provides that the CJEU has jurisdiction ‘in respect solely of the procedural
stipulations’ of Article 7 TEU. By contrast, the Conditionality Regulation is a normal
legislative act of the EU, in respect of which the CJEU has full jurisdiction. This
means that any decisions made pursuant to the Regulation are, in principle,
justiciable.
What does this imply in practice? When the Council, on the Commission’s
proposition, adopts the implementing decision referred to in Article 6(9) of the
Regulation imposing disciplinary measures (cutting off EU funds) from a Member
State deemed not to respect the rule of law, any such implementing decision may be
challenged in court. Concretely, this may involve evaluating whether the breaches
‘affect or seriously risk affecting’ the EU budget ‘in a sufficiently direct way’, as
required in Article 4(1) of the Regulation (and whether prior case law contains
any guidance). In contrast to the likely upcoming action by Poland and Hungary,
the challenge against a Council’s implementing decision will be heard first by the
General Court, with the possibility of appeal to the Court of Justice.
Although such future actions might not reach the CJEU in 2021, it seems quite
possible that a Member State from which EU funding is cut off pursuant to the
Regulation will challenge the measure. However, this will not only prolong the
resolution of the underlying rule of law issues, but also take the CJEU into assessing
the merits of determining whether the Member State has breached the rule of law,
as proposed by the Commission and found by the majority of the Council. Would
the CJEU, then, be adjudicating in fact on a determination of a ‘breach of values’,
which Article 269 TFEU originally intended to exclude from its jurisdiction? Or will
the challenges be narrow enough to allow meaningful adjudication on concrete legal
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issues? It is safe to predict that such litigation at the CJEU will be worth watching
closely.
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